Fatal Flaws of Attack on Pearl Harbor

Today marks the 70th anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We’d like to mark this solemn anniversary by thanking all the veterans who served both in the Pacific and European theaters during World War II and by examining the fatal flaws in the attack by Japan.

In 1940, nationalistic and militaristic pride and the successful conquest of China were driving Japan inexorably toward war with the United States, and the paper conquest of Southeast Asia through a treaty with the Vichy French gave Japan control of vast new territory that resulted in the U.S. embargo of strategic materials and seizure of Japanese assets. At this point war seemed inevitable, although many Japanese military leaders were concerned about the long-range implications of a protracted war with such an industrial powerhouse. As the storm clouds darkened, Admiral Isoruko Yamamoto expressed doubt, apprehension, even disgust over Japan’s headlong push toward conflict and observed that it would be a terrible mistake to “wake a sleeping giant.”

But a loyal commander, Yamamoto dutifully began plans to attack the American fleet, based at Pearl Harbor. Approval of the operation was given on 6 September 1941, and December 7 became “the day that will live in infamy.” Although Yamamoto viewed any attack on the United States as a strategic mistake, and hinged any hope of success on smashing our Pacific Fleet and demoralizing Washington, there were great tactical mistakes built into the attack on Pearl as well.

The attack on Pearl Harbor is often held as one of the most successful preemptive strikes in history. A candid analysis of what the attack was intended to accomplish—and how fatal tactical flaws within the attack plan made the attack fail in the initial goal and ultimately led Japan into a war it could not possibly win in the long term—belies that characterization. That the Japanese indeed caught the giant asleep is undisputable, but, alas, they wasted their only shot at crippling the sleeping giant.

The fatal flaws in the attack on Pearl? Who better to state them than Admiral Chester Nimitz, whom President Roosevelt called from a concert the night of the attack to give him command of the Pacific Fleet.

In his small volume Reflections on Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz recalled arriving at Pearl to assume command on Christmas Day, 1941. After a boat tour through the wreckage of sunken battleships and naval vessels that was once our Pacific Fleet, the helmsman asked the admiral’s reaction.

Nimitz was never known as loquacious, but he was candid: “The Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could ever make, or God was taking care of America.” 



The fatal flaws in the attack?

1. “[T]he Japanese attacked on Sunday morning. Nine out of every ten crewmen of those ships were ashore on leave. If those same ships had been lured to sea and been sunk—we would have lost 38,000 men instead of 3,800.
2. “[W]hen the Japanese saw all those battleships lined in a row, they got so carried away sinking those battleships, they never once bombed our dry docks opposite those ships. If they had destroyed our dry docks, we would have had to tow every one of those ships to America to be repaired. As it is now, the ships are in shallow water and can be raised. One tug can pull them over to the dry docks, and we can have them repaired and at sea by the time we could have towed them to America. And I already have crews ashore anxious to man those ships.
3. 

“[E]every drop of fuel in the Pacific theater of war is in top-of-the-ground storage tanks five miles away over that hill. One attack plane could have strafed those tanks and destroyed our fuel supply. That’s why I say the Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could make or God was taking care of America.”

A third-wave Japanese attack had been contemplated to address such matters as the fuel depot, but low on fuel himself and fearful of the American carriers missed at sea, Admiral Nagumo aboard the flagship Akagi took the Japanese task force back to Japan. And now it was too late: they had awakened the Sleeping Giant, and the decision to disengage dramatically lessened the long-term effect of the attack.